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INTRODUCTION

In Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 1 the Minnesota Supreme Court
settled the fate of a dog named Brody, who was put on “Doggie
Death Row” 2 by the City of Lino Lakes, Minnesota, in 2010 after he
injured three people—biting at least two of the three. 3 The
supreme court held that Brody’s owner, Sawh, had no procedural
due process right to a hearing on the City’s first designation of
Brody as “potentially dangerous,” because the City could not
restrict or deprive Sawh’s property interest in Brody at the time of
the designation. 4 The court also held the potentially dangerous
designation simply functioned as a warning rather than a predicate
to subsequently designate Brody “dangerous” and order his
destruction. 5
Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes is not a case about a dog; it is about
whether the government may issue a warning giving an individual
notice that he or she is not in accordance with the law, and then
use the mere existence of the warning as a predicate offense in a
subsequent charge, without giving the individual a chance to refute
the correctness of the issuance of the warning. While the
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled this result does not offend the
Due Process Clause, this note argues to the contrary.

1. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes (Sawh II), 823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012).
2. Brief and Appendix of Respondent/Cross-Appellant Mitchell Sawh,
Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012) (No. A10-2143), 2011 WL 9974680, at *20
[hereinafter Sawh’s Supreme Court Brief] (describing Brody’s confinement as
“Doggie Death Row”).
3. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630–31. The parties and courts disagreed on
whether the first incident was a bite. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
4. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 632.
5. Id. at 635.
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This note begins by discussing the history of the Due Process
Clause, cases involving procedural due process rights, and the
history of Minnesota’s “dangerous dog” laws. 6 The note then
discusses the facts of Sawh, and the opinions issued by the
Minnesota Court of Appeals and Minnesota Supreme Court. 7
This note primarily argues that while the Minnesota Supreme
Court correctly determined Sawh had no procedural due process
right to a hearing at the time Brody was designated “potentially
dangerous,” Sawh had a due process right to a post hoc hearing on
the correctness of the potentially dangerous designation because
the designation was used as a predicate to later deprive Sawh of his
property. 8 This note also argues that the supreme court in Sawh
erred in minimizing Sawh’s property interest in his dog, Brody, by
determining the value of a dog is measured by its “fair market
value.” 9
II. HISTORY
A. Origins and Principles of the Due Process Clause
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution prohibit the federal government and the states,
respectively, from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.” 10 The Minnesota State Constitution has
an identical due process provision, 11 which provides identical
protections as the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. 12
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court is only bound by the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court as to what the Due Process
Clause prohibits, 13 and “may interpret the Minnesota Constitution
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally 2 RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15.2, at 803
(5th ed. 2012) (explaining the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to ensure
that former slaves were not deprived of newly gained freedoms from the states).
11. M INN. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.”).
12. Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Minn. 1988) (citing
Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 190, 32 N.W.2d 538, 541 (1948)).
13. 7 DUNNELL M INN. DIGEST CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.01, at 341 (4th ed.
1990) (citing State v. Oman, 261 Minn. 10, 20–21, 110 N.W.2d 514, 522–23
(1961)).
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to afford more protection than provided under the U.S.
Constitution.” 14
The U.S. Supreme Court interprets the Due Process Clause as
imposing two limits on government: procedural due process and
substantive due process. 15 Procedural due process refers to the
procedures that the government must follow before it deprives
someone of life, liberty, or property. 16 Substantive due process “asks
whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a
person’s life, liberty, or property.” 17 This note is only concerned
with procedural due process, specifically in relation to property
rights.
Since the Due Process Clause’s origin in the Magna Carta in
1215, the requirement for “due process of law” has meant to
prohibit the state from conducting arbitrary proceedings and to
require certain procedures to ensure fairness. 18 Procedural due
process at its core requires notice and an opportunity to be heard
“at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 19 Its essence
ensures individuals will be protected by rudimentary requirements
of “fair play.” 20 The Due Process Clause is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands. 21
For example, depending on the circumstances, constitutionally
sufficient due process can range from the full panoply of trial rights
in a criminal proceeding to an informal hearing to review a school
disciplinary decision. 22

14. State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn. 1999) (citing PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)).
15. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7.1, at 557 (4th ed. 2013).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 558.
18. See M AGNA CARTA § 39 (1215) (“No Freeman shall be taken, imprisoned
or disseized . . . unless by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land.”); JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 7–8 (2003) (explaining how “law of
the land” became synonymous with “due process of law”). For a general history of
the Due Process Clause, see LUCIUS POLK M CGEHEE , DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1906); ORTH, supra; RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS (Jack Stark ed., 2004).
19. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see Grannis v. Ordean,
234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 7.1, at 558.
20. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954); accord Juster Bros. v. Christgau,
214 Minn. 108, 119, 7 N.W.2d 501, 507–08 (1943).
21. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); accord Brooks v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety, 584 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
22. E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (approving the use of an
informal hearing to review a decision to suspend a student).
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From New Property to the Mathews Balancing Test

After the New Deal and the growth of the administrative state
disbursing new benefits to its citizenry, the Supreme Court
grappled with the question of what constitutes a property interest
that triggers the Due Process Clause. 23
Before the 1970s the U.S. Supreme Court maintained a
categorical distinction between a property right and a privilege:
“If an individual owned some object of value like a house or car, he
had a property ‘right’ protected from arbitrary government
deprivation by Due Process.” 24 A government bestowed “privilege”
did not require the government to provide due process. 25 In 1892
then-state court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes illustrated the
right/privilege distinction in a case where a police officer was fired
from his job for expressing unpopular views: “The petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.” 26 The U.S. Supreme Court
followed Holmes’s lead, finding that an individual had no due
process rights “if a person was fired from a government job, or had
government benefits terminated or had an occupational license
revoked.” 27
In the 1960s Professor Charles Reich argued that with the
growth of the administrative state, a variety of new forms of
government wealth were created, which Reich labeled as “new
property.” 28 Reich wrote that society today is built around
state-granted entitlements, such as public education, Social
Security, occupational licenses, and welfare benefits. 29 By the 1960s,
society no longer viewed these entitlements as gratuities or charity,

23. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 7.3.2, at 572–75.
24. RICHARD J. PIERCE , JR. ET AL ., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.3.1a,
at 235 (4th ed. 2004).
25. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 7.3.1, at 569.
26. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892),
cited in PIERCE ET AL ., supra note 24, § 6.3.1a, at 235.
27. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 7.3.1, at 569 (citing Fleming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603 (1960) (government benefits); Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442,
451 (1954) (occupational license); Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951)
(government job)); see also 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 10, § 17.2, at 5–9.
28. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 7.3.1, at 571; see Charles A. Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter Reich, New Property]; see also Charles
A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245 (1965) [hereinafter Reich, Individual Rights].
29. Reich, Individual Rights, supra note 28, at 1255.
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but rather as fully deserved essentials. 30 Reich argued that because
government benefits hold the same place in a person’s life
traditionally occupied by property, sufficient due process is
required upon their termination or restriction. 31
In 1970 the U.S. Supreme Court repudiated its right/privilege
distinction in Goldberg v. Kelly. 32 Citing Reich’s law review articles,
the Court in Goldberg recognized that welfare benefits were a
property right affording the recipient an evidentiary hearing before
those benefits were terminated. 33 Because the Court recognized
“statutory entitlement[s]” as a new source of property implicating
the Due Process Clause, the Goldberg opinion triggered a “due
process explosion.” 34 Expanding the modern meaning of property,
the Court subsequently found that certain state-granted benefits,
such as food stamps, 35 public employment, 36 driver’s licenses, 37 and
professional licenses, 38 were potentially property, thus triggering
the Due Process Clause and a right to some sort of hearing before
deprivation. 39
Given that these new forms of property recognized by the
Supreme Court may vary in weight and importance, in the 1970s
the Court set up a two-question analysis to determine how much
and what type of procedural due process is required. 40
The first question the Court asks is a threshold determination:
has a state action deprived or restricted a person’s life, liberty, or
property interest? 41 In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, the
30. Id.
31. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 7.3.1, at 571.
32. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
33. Id. at 262. See generally 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 10, § 17.2, at 5
(stating that hearings and processes are owed when government action impairs an
individual’s property); Reich, New Property, supra note 28, at 733 (stating that
valuables dispensed by the government supplant traditional forms of private
property wealth).
34. CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 75 (Marlin Volz
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997); see Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.
35. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.
36. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599–600 (1972). But see Bd. of
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (finding a state college
professor had no property interest where the employment contract was for only
one year).
37. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
38. Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
39. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 10, § 17.2, at 6–8.
40. See, e.g., Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
41. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–70; cf. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Elk River Ready
Mix Co., 430 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (finding a person was not
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Court held that to have a property interest in a benefit, a person
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it—”[h]e must,
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” 42
The second question the Court asks is whether the procedures
used by the state to deprive a person’s property were
constitutionally sufficient. 43 The Court in Mathews v. Eldridge 44
created a three-part balancing test to determine the constitutional
sufficiency of the procedures. 45 The Court balances:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail. 46
Professor Richard J. Pierce criticizes the Mathews test for two
related reasons. First, Pierce notes that in determining the weight
of the private interest, the Mathews test requires each judge to
insert his or her subjective view concerning the relative value of
hundreds of incomparable interests. 47 Such interests, for example,
could range from welfare benefits to a household pet. Second,
Professor Pierce notes that because each judge may put different
values on various liberty and property interests and the value of
additional procedures, the result of the application of the Mathews
balancing test can be unpredictable. 48
Despite these criticisms, the Mathews test has shown to be
durable and flexible. Since 2003 the U.S. Supreme Court has
employed the test in deciding matters as practical as how long a city
may delay holding a hearing after a person’s car is towed. 49 On the

subjected to a deprivation of property where a notice was purely informational).
42. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. The court in Roth upheld its repudiation of the
right/privilege distinction and ruled that majestic terms like “liberty” and
“property” must be given some meaning. Id. at 571–72.
43. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. PIERCE ET AL ., supra note 24, § 6.3.4d, at 275.
48. Id. at 276. Despite these criticisms Professor Pierce prefers the Mathews
test to any alternative that has been identified to date. Id.; see infra notes 150–54
and accompanying text.
49. See City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 716 (2003).
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other end of the spectrum, the Court has also used the test to
decide national security matters as imperative as how much
procedure is due to suspected Al-Qaeda terrorists held at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 50
C.

Dangerous Dog Laws in Minnesota

The majority of states now regulate dogs through dangerous
dog statutes. 51 Minnesota’s dangerous dog statute, which was passed
in 1988, 52 was a reaction to several vicious dog bite incidents in the
state. 53 The law, like other dangerous dog statutes around the
country, seemed to be a preventive measure to identify dogs before
they bite people. 54
Minnesota Statutes section 347.50 defines a “dangerous dog”
as any dog that has:
(1) without provocation, inflicted substantial bodily harm
on a human being on public or private property;
(2) killed a domestic animal without provocation while off
the owner’s property; or
(3) been found to be potentially dangerous, and after the
owner has notice that the dog is potentially dangerous,
the dog aggressively bites, attacks, or endangers the safety
of humans or domestic animals. 55
A “potentially dangerous dog” is defined as any dog that:

50. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
51. Cynthia A. Mcneely & Sarah A. Lindquist, Dangerous Dog Laws: Failing to
Give Man’s Best Friend a Fair Shake at Justice, 3 J. ANIMAL L. 99, 112 (2007)
(discussing commonly shared characteristics of states’ dangerous dog laws).
52. Act approved May 4, 1988, ch. 711, 1988 Minn. Laws 1645 (codified as
amended at M INN. STAT. §§ 347.50–565 (2012)).
53. Dennis J. McGrath, Son’s Injury Led Woman to Seek Dog Legislation,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 5, 1988, at B1, available at 1988 WLNR 1657941
(describing the pit bull mauling of a six-year-old boy and his mother’s efforts to
lobby the Minnesota Legislature).
54. DAVID FAVRE , ANIMAL LAW: WELFARE INTERESTS AND RIGHTS 181 (2008)
(noting that in the 1970s state legislatures began to pass dangerous dog statutes as
preventive measures); Ellen Foley, Officials Preparing a Hearing on Pit Bull that Bit St.
Paul Boy, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 29, 1987, at B3, available at 1987 WLNR
1363674 (“[H]ealth officials are eagerly awaiting the passage of a proposed dogcontrol ordinance that could identify dangerous dogs before they bite people.”).
A more complete account of the legislative intent behind Minnesota’s dangerous
dog statute is not possible because audio recordings of the Minnesota Legislature
floor debates and committee hearings prior to the year 1991 are not available.
55. M INN. STAT. § 347.50, subdiv. 2 (2012) (emphasis added).
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(1) when unprovoked, inflicts bites on a human or
domestic animal on public or private property;
(2) when unprovoked, chases or approaches a person,
including a person on a bicycle, upon the streets,
sidewalks, or any public or private property, other than
the dog owner’s property, in an apparent attitude of
attack; or
(3) has a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to
attack unprovoked, causing injury or otherwise
threatening the safety of humans or domestic animals. 56
Once a dog has been declared “dangerous” by an animal
control authority, its owner is required to follow a number of
restrictions, such as registering the dog, posting visible signs
warning the public of a dangerous dog, and obtaining liability
insurance of at least $300,000. 57 A person that does not comply with
these restrictions is guilty of a misdemeanor, and any subsequent
offenses are charged as gross misdemeanors. 58
Under Minnesota Statutes section 347.541, an owner of any
dog declared “dangerous” has the right to notice and a hearing by
an impartial hearing officer. 59 An owner also has the right to a
hearing when an animal control authority orders a dog to be
euthanized in the event of a subsequent offense after the
dangerous dog designation. 60
Finally, the Minnesota Legislature enabled any city or county
to regulate potentially dangerous and dangerous dogs in a more
56. Id. § 347.50, subdiv. 3.
57. Id. § 347.51.
58. Id. § 347.55(a), (c). In Minnesota, a misdemeanor has a sentence of up
to ninety days in jail, a $1000 fine, or both. Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 3. A gross
misdemeanor has a sentence of up to one year in jail, a $3,000 fine, or both.
Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 4. Under Minnesota law a person may also be convicted of a
crime for not following the restrictions placed on his or her dog deemed
“potentially dangerous” under the statute. Id. § 347.515 (providing an owner of a
potentially dangerous dog must have a microchip implanted in the dog);
id. § 347.55(a) (providing that it is a misdemeanor to violate a provision of section
347.515). Even though the statute places restrictions on a potentially dangerous
dog, the dog’s owner has no right to challenge the potentially dangerous
designation that served as a predicate—as there need be no hearing to determine
the validity of the potentially dangerous designation under the statute.
See id. § 347.541, subdiv. 1, 4; cf. State v. Cowan, 814 N.E.2d 846, 848–50 (Ohio
2004) (finding an ordinance unconstitutional where an unreviewable vicious dog
designation was used as an element of a “failing to confine a vicious dog” criminal
offense).
59. M INN. STAT. § 347.541, subdiv. 1–3.
60. Id. § 347.54, subdiv. 3.
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restrictive manner. 61 Minnesota’s dangerous dog laws, though, are
not self-executing, meaning cities lack the authority to enforce the
laws where the city has not adopted a procedure for the provision’s
implementation. 62 Therefore, many cities have their own dangerous
dog ordinances, with varying procedures, to control dangerous
dogs or animals. 63
III. THE SAWH DECISION
A. Facts
Mitchell Sawh, a Lino Lakes, Minnesota resident, owned a dog
named Brody. 64 In 2010, Brody injured three individuals—biting at
least two of the three. 65 After the third incident and a number of
appeals to the City of Lino Lakes, the City ordered that Brody be
euthanized. 66
1. The April 8th Incident
On April 8, 2010, Sawh’s dog Brody either bit or scratched the
left arm of a pedestrian near Sawh’s home. 67 According to the City,
Brody bit the pedestrian. 68 The victim told an investigating officer

61. Id. § 347.53; see, e.g., Hannan v. City of Minneapolis, 623 N.W.2d 281,
284–85 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that Minnesota Statutes chapter 347 does
not preempt or conflict with a city ordinance regulating dangerous dogs).
62. In re Molly, 712 N.W.2d 567, 570–71 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
63. Procedures provided in city ordinances vary in amount of process given.
Compare BROOKLYN PARK, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 92.25(B) (2013) (providing
a “record review” by the chief of police when a potentially dangerous
dog designation is appealed), with LAKEVILLE , M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES,
§ 5-1-9(B)(1)(d) (2013) (providing a hearing consisting of the right to present
evidence through witnesses and exhibits, cross-examine witnesses, and be heard in
front of an impartial hearing officer).
64. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Minn. 2012).
65. Id. While the Minnesota Supreme Court found Brody bit three people,
Sawh argued that Brody playfully scratched the passerby in the first incident, and
the Minnesota Court of Appeals found the record was unclear if Brody bit or
scratched the passerby. Compare id. at 630, with Sawh’s Supreme Court Brief, supra
note 2, at *8–10, and Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes (Sawh I), 800 N.W.2d 663, 665
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012).
66. Abby Simons, Biting Dog to be Euthanized Today, Its Appeals Exhausted,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 21, 2012, at B3, available at 2012 WLNR 27689427.
67. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630.
68. Appellant/Cross-Respondent City of Lino Lakes’ Brief and Addendum,
Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627 (No. A10-2143), 2012 WL 9974679, at *2 [hereinafter
City’s Supreme Court Brief].
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that Brody came up to him “aggressively” and “ended up . . . biting
his left arm causing the injury.” 69 The officer observed a “fairly large
series of bloody scratches” on the pedestrian’s arm that were
“consistent with a dog’s teeth.” 70 According to Sawh, Brody was
walking and “happily wagging his tail,” and then he “simply jumped
up on a pedestrian in a playful manner, and the pedestrian,
unfortunately, was scratched.” 71
In response to the April 8 incident, the City designated Brody
as “potentially dangerous” under section 503.15 of the Lino Lakes,
Minnesota, Code of Ordinances (“City Code”). 72 The City Code
gave Sawh no right to appeal the potentially dangerous
designation; 73 however, the City placed no restrictions on Brody. 74
2. The October 15th Bite and Appeal
On October 15, 2010, Brody undisputedly bit a second
passerby. 75 The City then designated Brody as “dangerous” under
the City Code, 76 informing Sawh he must remove Brody from the
69. Respondent City of Lino Lakes’ Brief and Appendix at Appendix,
Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d 663 (No. A10-2143) 2011 WL 3799463, app. at CA-6
[hereinafter City’s Appeals Court Brief]. Only the PDF image of the City’s brief on
Westlaw contains the appendix.
70. Id.
71. Sawh’s Supreme Court Brief, supra note 2, at *8–10.
72. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630. The relevant portions of the Lino Lakes City
Code are reprinted in the appendix of the City of Lino Lakes’ brief to the
Minnesota Court of Appeals. See City’s Appeals Court Brief, supra note 69,
app. at CA-31 to -35. The City Code’s statutory scheme allows an animal control
officer to designate a dog as “‘potentially dangerous’ . . . upon receiving evidence
that a[n] . . . animal has, when unprovoked, then bitten, attacked or threatened
the safety of a person or a domestic animal as stated in division (3)(b) above.”
LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(4) (2010), reprinted in City’s
Appeals Court Brief, supra note 69, app. at CA-32. Section 503.15(3)(b) defines a
“potentially dangerous” animal as an animal that has:
1. Bitten a human or domestic animal on public or private property;
2. When unprovoked, chased or approached a person upon the
streets, sidewalks, or any other public property in an apparent attitude
of attack; or
3. Has engaged in unprovoked attacks causing injury or otherwise
threatening the safety of humans or domestic animals.
73. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630; Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d at 665 (“Neither the
written notification nor the ordinance provided [Sawh] a meaningful opportunity
to challenge the potentially dangerous animal declaration.”).
74. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630.
75. Id.
76. Id.; see also LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(5)(b),
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city within fourteen days. 77 The City Code allows an officer to
designate an animal as “dangerous” where an animal has previously
been declared “potentially dangerous” and then subsequently bites,
attacks, or threatens the safety of a person or animal, pursuant to
section 503.15(3)(a) of the City Code. 78 The relevant clauses of
section 503.15(3)(a) define a dangerous animal as one that has:
“4. Bitten one or more persons on two or more occasions; or
5. Been found to be potentially dangerous and/or the owner has
personal knowledge of the same, the animal aggressively bites,
attacks or endangers the safety of humans or domestic animals.” 79
Sawh appealed the dangerous designation at a November 8,
2010, hearing before the Lino Lakes City Council; 80 however, the
Council did not formally review the potentially dangerous
designation. 81 Sawh argued that both the Lino Lakes Police Chief
and City Attorney made a presentation to the City Council that
Brody was conclusively deemed “potentially dangerous,” and that
the issue would not be revisited. 82
The City Council classified Brody as “dangerous” pursuant to
section 503.15(3)(a)(5) because Brody had been designated
“potentially dangerous” and then subsequently bit another
person. 83 The City required Sawh to comply with a series of
restrictions, such as posting a dangerous dog sign, keeping Brody
enclosed and muzzled at all times, and maintaining $300,000 in
liability insurance. 84

quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 635.
77. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630; see LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES
§ 503.15(7), reprinted in City’s Appeals Court Brief, supra note 69, app. at CA-33.
78. LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(5), quoted in Sawh II,
823 N.W.2d at 635.
79. Id. § 503.15(3)(a), quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 636.
80. See Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630.
81. Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d 663, 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
82. Sawh’s Supreme Court Brief, supra note 2, at *12–13.
83. Id.; see also Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d at 669 (“[W]e conclude that the city
deemed [Sawh]’s dog ‘dangerous’ because the dog had already been declared
‘potentially dangerous’ and subsequently bit a person.”).
84. LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.16(1) (providing a list of
restrictions the City may impose on an owner of a dog designated as “dangerous”),
reprinted in City’s Appeals Court Brief, supra note 69, app. at CA-34.
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3. The November 9th Bite and Appeal
On November 9, 2010, a day after the dangerous dog hearing,
Brody bit a third person. 85 The Police Chief impounded Brody,
informing Sawh the incident was a “subsequent bite” under the City
Code, which required the City to destroy Brody. 86 Sawh appealed
and was granted a hearing where the City Council found the biting
was a “subsequent offense” under the City Code, which required
the City to kill Brody. 87
B.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals Decision

Sawh appealed the City Council’s decisions to the Minnesota
Court of Appeals. 88 Under the Roth threshold question, the appeals
court found that a protected property interest had been implicated
because dogs are considered private property. 89 Balancing the three
Mathews factors, the appeals court reversed the City Council’s
decisions. The appeals court held that Sawh was denied sufficient
procedural due process when the dangerous designation and the
City Council’s order to euthanize Brody were predicated on the
City’s potentially dangerous designation, which Sawh was not given
a right to challenge. 90
The appeals court found that Sawh had “little interest in
harboring animals that may be dangerous.” 91 The court, however,
agreed with Sawh under the second Mathews factor that there was a
significant risk of an erroneous deprivation of property because
Sawh was not provided with an opportunity to challenge the
potentially dangerous designation, which acted as a predicate
offense and not a mere warning notice. 92 The court weighed the
85. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 631.
86. LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.16(4) (providing that if an
animal designated as “dangerous” is found to have committed a “subsequent
offense” the animal control officer shall order the animal destroyed), quoted in
Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 636–37.
87. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 631.
88. Id.
89. Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d 663, 668 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 823 N.W.2d
627 (Minn. 2012); see Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 633 (explaining the Roth standard).
90. Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d at 670.
91. Id. at 668 (quoting Am. Dog Owners Ass’n v. City of Minneapolis, 453
N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. Ct. App 1990)).
92. Id. at 668–69. The appeals court agreed with Sawh that the potentially
dangerous designation at the November 8 dangerous dog hearing was not up for
debate because the Lino Lakes City Attorney and Chief of Police treated the
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third Mathews factor in favor of Sawh because it found many
municipalities around the state provide some sort of review after a
city designates a dog “potentially dangerous.” 93
C.

The Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion

The Minnesota Supreme Court also conducted the two-step
analysis to determine if Sawh’s due process rights had been
violated. 94 Under the Roth threshold question, while the court
recognized that dogs have long been considered personal
property, 95 the court ruled that Sawh had no right to challenge the
potentially dangerous designation because “procedural due process
protections do not apply when government action may lead to a
deprivation . . . [of property] at some indeterminate point.” 96 The
court determined Sawh’s property was deprived when the City
designated Brody as “dangerous” and ordered Brody’s
destruction. 97
Balancing the three Mathews factors, the Minnesota Supreme
Court concluded the City’s procedures used to deprive Sawh of his
property were constitutionally sufficient.98 Measuring Sawh’s private
interest under the first Mathews factor, the court noted that while
animal owners may have sentimental attachments to their pets,
under Minnesota law a dog is measured by its “fair market value”
and is treated like any other piece of tangible property. 99
Under the second Mathews factor, the court found that the
City’s procedures used to designate Brody as “dangerous” and issue
a destruction order did not create a risk of an erroneous

potentially dangerous designation as conclusive. Id. at 669.
93. Id. at 670 (referencing city ordinances from Golden Valley, Plymouth,
Minneapolis, and St. Paul, Minnesota, which all provide a right to appeal or review
of a potentially dangerous designation).
94. See Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 632 (citing Ky. Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson,
490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Carillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 768 (Minn. 2005));
supra Part II.
95. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 632 (citing Corn v. Sheppard, 179 Minn. 490, 492,
229 N.W. 869, 870 (1930)).
96. Id. at 633 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569
(1972)).
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
99. Id. (citing Corn, 179 Minn. at 492, 229 N.W. at 870; Smith v. St. Paul City
Ry. Co., 79 Minn. 254, 256, 82 N.W. 577, 578 (1900); Harrow v. St. Paul & Duluth
R.R. Co., 43 Minn. 71, 72, 44 N.W. 881, 881 (1890)).
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deprivation of property. 100 The court reasoned that because Sawh
was able to present witnesses, explain his version of the events, and
argue against the City’s findings at two separate hearings, the City’s
procedures were “consistent with the requirements of due process,”
even if weightier interests had been at stake. 101
Setting aside the question about whether Sawh’s property
interest was implicated, the state supreme court’s conclusion
differed with both Sawh’s argument and the court of appeals’
holding that the potentially dangerous designation functioned as a
predicate. 102 The Minnesota Supreme Court instead found that “the
purpose of the ‘potentially dangerous’ designation is simply to put
owners on notice of their animal’s dangerous tendencies.” 103 The
court supported its argument by construing section 503.15(5)(b) of
the City Code as requiring the mere existence—not the correctness—
of a potentially dangerous designation, as well as written notice to
the owner, for the City to declare an animal “dangerous,” after a
subsequent bite or attack. 104
Under the third Mathews factor, the supreme court found “that
the City ha[d] a compelling interest in insuring the health and
safety of its citizens,” 105 and had an interest in avoiding
administrative and financial burdens with additional hearings. 106
IV. ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court was correct that, under Board of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, Sawh had no due process right to
challenge the City’s potentially dangerous designation at the time
the designation was issued because Sawh’s property could not be
restricted or deprived. 107 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court
100. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 634–35.
101. Id. at 634 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (approving of
an informal hearing by a school to review a decision to discipline a student)).
102. See id. at 634–35.
103. Id. at 635.
104. Id. at 634–35 (construing LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES
§ 503.15(4), (5)(b) (2010), quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 635–37).
105. Id. at 635 (citing State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 570 (Minn. 2007)).
106. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976)).
107. Id. at 633; see Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–75
(1972). While outside the scope of this note because the author agrees with the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s determination that the potentially dangerous
designation alone does not implicate the Due Process Clause, some have argued
that Roth set too high of a bar for what types of interests trigger a right to due
process. See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11:2, at 344
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erred in its reasoning in several respects and failed to properly
balance the interests involved when it applied the Mathews test.
Section A.1 examines how the court under-weighed Sawh’s
private interest in the life of his companion animal and explains
why the court should abandon its treatment of companion animals
as mere “tangible property” that is measured by the animal’s “fair
market value.” Section A.2.a demonstrates how the court’s
construction of the Lino Lakes dangerous dog ordinance, as only
requiring the existence and not correctness of the potentially
dangerous designation, leads to absurd and unreasonable results.
Section A.2.b finds that the facts of Sawh are sufficiently analogous
to a series of cases from the U.S., Minnesota, and Ohio Supreme
Courts, which hold that an individual has a due process right to a
hearing on an unreviewed designation or offense that is
subsequently used as a predicate offense. Section A.3 discusses the
government’s interest and the potential financial burdens to cities
by providing additional process. Finally, section B proposes an
alternative holding to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling.
A. Sawh’s Right to Due Process Under the Mathews Test
1. The Court Minimized Sawh’s Private Interest
Under the first Mathews factor, the court minimized Sawh’s
private property interest in his dog Brody. The Sawh court missed
an opportunity to recognize our society’s overwhelming consensus
that animals in general, and “companion animals” 108 in particular,

(2d ed. 1979) (arguing that where a person has an interest he reasonably believes
to be vital to him, the person should not be administratively deprived of that
interest without fair procedure); William Van Alstyne, Cracks in “The New
Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
445, 487–89 (1977) (arguing that the meaning of liberty in the Due Process Clause
includes a freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures regardless if one’s
property interest is implicated or not).
108. See M INN. STAT. § 343.20, subdiv. 6 (2012) (defining pets and companion
animals synonymously as including “any animal owned, possessed by, cared for, or
controlled by a person for the present or future enjoyment of that person or
another as a pet or companion”); Definition of Companion Animal, A.S.P.C.A.,
http://www.aspca.org/about-us/aspca-policy-and-position-statements/definition
-of-companion-animal (last visited Sept. 19, 2013) (defining companion animals as
domesticated or domestic-bred animals “whose physical, emotional, behavioral
and social needs can be readily met as companions in the home, or in a close daily
relationship with humans”), cited in Sabrina DeFabritiis, Barking Up the Wrong Tree:
Companion Animals, Emotional Damages and the Judiciary’s Failure to Keep Pace,
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are something more than mere property and are often times
considered members of the family. 109
Invoking century-old precedent on animal law, the court
determined that Minnesota currently treats animals “like any other
item of tangible personal property.” 110 This determination,
however, is outdated and incorrect. Minnesota, like almost all of
the states 111 and the federal government, affords extra protection to
animals—especially companion animals—through animal anticruelty laws. 112 Second, animals are treated differently from
property in other areas of the law, such as inheritance and tort
law. 113 Minnesota’s common-law notion that dog owners should
only receive fair market value for their pets should be ignored as a
legal anachronism. The notion stems from the fact that dogs were
traditionally not considered property and were subsequently given
the same method of valuation as farm animals, which do have an
ascertainable market value. 114 Finally, because courts employing the
Mathews test are balancing interests and not awarding exact
monetary values, like in torts cases, courts should recognize animal
owners’ more ethereal interests in an animal’s companionship,

32 N. ILL . U. L. REV. 237, 237 n.2 (2012).
109. See AP Poll: Americans Consider Pets Family, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 24, 2009),
http://www.nola.com/pets/index.ssf/2009/06/ap_poll_americans_consider_pet
.html (“[H]alf of all American pet owners consider their pets as much a part of the
family as any other person in the household; another 36 percent said their pet is
part of the family but not a full member.”); Press Release, ASPCA, ASPCA
Research Shows Americans Overwhelmingly Support Investigations to Expose
Animal Abuse on Industrial Farms (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.aspca.org/about
-us/press-releases/aspca-research-shows-americans-overwhelmingly-supportinvestigations-expose (“[Seventy-one] percent of Americans support undercover
investigative efforts by animal welfare organizations to expose animal abuse on
industrial farms.”); see also DeFabritiis, supra note 108, at 242 n.36 (surveying polls
that show Americans’ strong affinity to their pets).
110. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 633 (citing Corn v. Sheppard, 179 Minn. 490, 492,
229 N.W. 869, 870 (1930) (holding a dog is personal property); Harrow v. St. Paul
& Duluth R.R. Co., 43 Minn. 71, 72, 44 N.W. 881, 881 (1890) (setting fair market
value as the proper measure of damages for the death of a horse)).
111. See Samantha D.E. Tucker, No Way to Treat Man’s Best Friends: The
Uncounted Injuries of Animal Cruelty Victims, 19 ANIMAL L. 151, 157 (2012)
(explaining as of 2012, forty-eight states have felony animal abuse provisions).
112. See 7 U.S.C. 54 §§ 2131–2159 (2012); M INN. STAT. §§ 343.20–343.40
(2012).
113. See infra Part IV.A.1.b.
114. FAVRE , supra note 54, at 36–38.
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similar to how courts handle the ethereal interests in “new
property.” 115
a. Minnesota’s Animal Anti-Cruelty Statute
Minnesota broadly defines an animal as “every living creature
except members of the human race.” 116 Pet or “companion animal”
is separately defined as “any animal owned, possessed by, cared for,
or controlled by a person for the present or future enjoyment of
that person or another as a pet or companion.” 117
Demonstrating an intent to protect companion animals from
cruelty, in 2001 the Minnesota Legislature created harsher
penalties for violating Minnesota’s animal anti-cruelty law when a
pet or companion animal is harmed. 118 The current animal anticruelty statute makes it a misdemeanor where an individual, among
other things, tortures, neglects, abandons, or acts cruelly toward
any animal. 119 It is a felony for an individual to mistreat a
companion animal in certain ways that cause “great bodily harm”
or death to the animal. 120 Minnesota has banned animal fighting
events since 1905, 121 and since 1981 dogfighting or promoting any
fighting between domestic animals has been a felony-level
offense. 122
Like an owner of any property, the owners of companion
animals have a certain “bundle of rights”: the right to possess, use,
115. Compare Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (finding a continued
possession of a license may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood),
and Mertins v. Comm’r of Natural Res., 755 N.W.2d 329, 336–37 (Minn. Ct. App.
2008) (finding procedural due process protects state-issued licenses that are vital
to the pursuit of a chosen livelihood or profession), with Brousseau v. Rosenthal,
443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286–87 (Civ. Ct. 1980) (awarding a plaintiff $550 plus costs and
disbursements for the loss of companionship and protection of a dog).
116. M INN. STAT. § 343.20, subdiv. 2.
117. Id. § 343.20, subdiv. 6.
118. Corwin R. Kruse, Adding a Bit More Bite: Suggestions for Improving AnimalProtection Laws in Minnesota, 34 WM. M ITCHELL L. REV. 1405, 1410 (2008) (citing
Act of June 30, 2001, ch. 8, art. 8, §§ 5–13, 2001 Minn. Laws 1943, 2076–79
(codified as amended at M INN. STAT. §§ 343.20–.21, .235)).
119. M INN. STAT. § 343.21, subdiv. 1–7, 9(a).
120. Id. § 343.21, subdiv. 9(d). The definitions for substantial and great bodily
harm are nearly identical to the definitions in the criminal code concerning
crimes against a person. Compare id. § 340.20, subdiv. 8–9 (animals), with id.
§ 609.02, subdiv. 7a–8 (people).
121. REVISED LAWS M INNESOTA 1905, at 1086 (Mark B. Dunnell ed. 1906).
122. Act approved Apr. 8, 1981, ch. 22, § 1, 1981 Minn. Laws 31, 31–32
(codified as amended at M INN. STAT. § 343.31).
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exclude, and transfer title through a sale or gift. 123 Similar to other
forms of property, not all of these rights attach to companion
animals. 124 For example, an owner’s right to use a car and a pet in
certain ways is restricted: there are speed limits and a pet owner is
not allowed to torture or use his or her animal in an animal fight.
However, there is a major distinction between “use restrictions” on
companion animals and other tangible pieces of property, such as a
car or house. Use restrictions on animals, as codified in
Minnesota’s anti-cruelty laws, are for the welfare and benefit of the
animal, and thus are more similar to child protection laws, 125 while
use restrictions on property such as cars, lawn mowers, or toxic
chemicals are for the benefits of both the owner and the wider
population.
Animal anti-cruelty laws distinguish animals as property from
other tangible property because the law stems from our
understanding that both vertebrate non-human animals and
humans have complex central nervous systems able to experience
physical pain and suffering. 126 As an early proponent for “animal
rights,” English barrister Jeremy Bentham argued animals’ capacity
for suffering is a vital characteristic that gives them, as living beings,
the right to legal consideration. 127

123. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL ., PROPERTY 83 (7th ed. 2010).
124. Id. at 84.
125. See David Favre, Living Property: A New Status for Animals Within the Legal
System, 93 M ARQ. L. REV. 1021, 1028–29 (2010) (explaining how early animal anticruelty laws in the 1860s reflected a shift in the law because they put restrictions
on animal owners out of concerns for the animals themselves). But see Kruse, supra
note 118, at 1409 (explaining that to a great extent animal-protection efforts have
still been about the protection of humans in that legislators link animal abuse with
the health of the family). In fact, in 1905 the Minnesota Legislature empowered
the Minnesota Society for the Prevention of Cruelty, the precursor for the
Minnesota Humane Society, to enforce laws and prosecute those who are guilty of
cruelty “to children and dumb animals.” Act approved Apr. 18, 1905, ch. 274, § 3,
1905 Minn. Laws 409, 409 (emphasis added) (codified as amended at M INN. STAT.
§ 343.01 (2012)).
126. Favre notes that scientists studying pain in invertebrate animals found
that invertebrates such as crabs and lobsters have only about 100,000 neurons
compared to 100 billion in people and other vertebrates. FAVRE , supra note 54,
at 17–18.
127. David Favre & Vivian Tsang, The Development of Anti-Cruelty Laws During
the 1800’s, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1, 3 (1993) (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF M ORALS AND LEGISLATION 310–11 n.1 (1781))
(“[T]he question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but Can they suffer?”).
For a discussion of the scientific foundation of recognizing animal pain and
pleasure, see JONATHAN BALCOMBE , PLEASURABLE KINGDOM: ANIMALS AND THE

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 10

2013] UNREVIEWA BLE WARNING NOTICES AS PREDICATES

b.

333

The Treatment of Animals in Other Areas of the Law

Animals are treated differently from inanimate property in
other areas of the law, such as inheritance and tort law. In
inheritance law, a majority of states have pet trust laws either
adopted from or modeled after the Uniform Probate Code or the
Uniform Trust Code, allowing pet owners to provide for the care of
their animal after the owner’s death. 128 A number of state courts
void clauses in wills on public policy grounds that demand the
destruction of the testator’s animals. 129
In a lost and found property case, the Vermont Supreme
Court refused to apply the state’s lost property statute to pets,
which it interpreted to apply to farm animals but not companion
animals. 130 The court reasoned that pets’ worth, unlike agricultural
animals, is not primarily financial, but emotional: “[The dog’s]
value derives from the animal’s relationship with its human
companions.” 131
In tort law, a minority of courts have approved damages for
owners whose companion animals have been killed by a negligent
act, even when the “actual value” or “intrinsic value” of the pet to
its owner 132 is beyond the fair market value of the animal. 133 Courts
NATURE OF FEELING GOOD (2006).
128. See BRUCE A. WAGMAN ET AL ., ANIMAL LAW 627–28 (4th ed. 2010)
(surveying pet trust law). See generally Frances H. Foster, Should Pets Inherit?, 63 FLA.
L. REV. 801 (2011) (discussing such topics as the ramifications and advisability of
pet inheritance).
129. See, e.g., In re Capers’ Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121, 141 (Pa. Orphans’ Ct.
1963) (voiding a testatrix’s will clause to destroy her Irish Setters); see also In re
Brand’s Estate, No. 28473 (Vt. Prob. Ct. Mar. 17, 1999) (finding testator’s will
clause to destroy his horses void as against public policy), reprinted in WAGMAN ET
AL ., supra note 128, at 598. Professor Susan J. Hankin writes that the case of In re
Brand’s Estate is “often cited because it so well exemplifies the difference between
animals and inanimate property.” Susan J. Hankin, Not a Living Room Sofa:
Changing the Legal Status of Companion Animals, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL ’ Y 314,
353 (2007). Hankin explained when the provisions of the Brand will (giving the
testator’s wishes for his car and horses both to be destroyed and killed) became
known “there was very little concern expressed about crushing the car, but a great
deal of public outcry about the fate of horses.” Id.
130. See Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630, 632 (Vt. 1997).
131. Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
132. “Actual” or “intrinsic” value refers to the value of property to the specific
person who happens to own it, as opposed to the value the property would receive
on the actual market. In re McCannel, 301 N.W.2d 910, 924, n.11 (Minn. 1980).
The court in Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, defined “intrinsic value” as “an
inherent value not established by market forces; it is a personal or sentimental
value. For example, the intrinsic value of trees is said to be comprised of both an
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“have adopted an ‘actual value’ approach when the market value
for [a piece of property] (1) is nonexistent, (2) cannot be
ascertained, or (3) is not a true measure of its worth.” 134 Courts
using the “actual value” approach will award an animal owner
reasonable replacement costs, for example, “the cost of purchasing
a puppy of the same breed, the cost of immunization, the cost of
neutering the pet, and the cost of comparable training.” 135
While the Minnesota Court of Appeals has rejected the “actual
value” approach to pet damages, 136 the Minnesota Supreme Court
awarded the “actual value” of a grove of ornamental trees to
plaintiffs who brought a negligence claim. 137 In C.S. McCrossan, the
supreme court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the actual
value of the trees, beyond their market value, because the trees had
“substantial value for shade and ornamental purposes” to the
landowners, which no market could reflect. 138 The C.S. McCrossan
case provides an analogy to the valuation of companion animals:
like the trees’ “intrinsic value” to the landowners for their shade
and ornamental purpose, any court in the future measuring a pet
owner’s interest could find a pet has a substantial “intrinsic value”
to its owner for its companionship purposes. 139 The supreme court
in Sawh missed this opportunity.
Today, Alaska, 140 California, 141 Florida, 142 Hawaii, 143 Idaho,144 and
Kentucky 145 allow pain and suffering or “loss of companionship”
ornamental (aesthetic) value and a utility (shade) value.” 144 S.W.3d 554, 563–64
(Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted).
133. See Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 314 (Alaska 2001); Jankoski v.
Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Brousseau
v. Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (Civ. Ct. 1980); Shera v. N.C. State Univ.
Veterinary Teaching Hosp., 723 S.E.2d 352, 357–58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012);
McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 40, 42 (Ct. Cl.
1994).
134. Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 192 n.57 (Tex. 2013).
135. Mitchell, 27 P.3d at 314.
136. Soucek v. Banham, 524 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing
Harrow v. St. Paul & Duluth R.R., 43 Minn. 71, 72, 44 N.W. 881, 881 (1890)),
abrogated on other grounds by Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
137. See Rector, Wardens & Vestry of St. Christopher’s Episcopal Church v.
C.S. McCrossan, Inc., 306 Minn. 143, 144–45, 235 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1975).
138. Id. at 144, 235 N.W.2d at 610.
139. Id. Contra Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 190. The Texas Supreme Court
rejected this analogy by noting a similar Texas case about the “intrinsic value” of
the “ornamental” or “aesthetic” trees was not rooted in the owner’s “subjective
emotions.” Id.
140. Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska
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damages beyond the fair market value of an animal to be recovered
when a pet has been killed by a tortious act. 146 States that do not
allow for non-economic emotional damages in animal torts cases
mostly base their reasoning on a public policy rationale that the
“flood gates” will open and a deluge of civil pet litigation will
result. 147 While the majority of states refuse to award emotional
distress or “loss of companionship” damages to pet owners whose
animals have been negligently or intentionally killed, 148 many courts
will preface their holdings with strong language indicating their
discomfort in labeling pets as mere property with a financial
value. 149
A valid criticism of considering Sawh’s “loss of companionship”
in Brody, or Brody’s “intrinsic value” to Sawh, as part of Sawh’s
1985) (“We recognize that the loss of a beloved pet can be especially distressing in
egregious situations.”).
141. Plotnik v. Meihaus, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 599–600 (Ct. App. 2012),
review denied, No. S205836, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 11667 (Dec. 12, 2012) (holding
California law allows a pet owner to recover for mental suffering caused by
another’s intentional act that injures or kills his or her animal).
142. La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964)
(“[W]e feel that the affection of a master for his dog is a very real thing and that
the malicious destruction of the pet provides an element of damage for which the
owner should recover. . . .”).
143. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Haw.
1981) (allowing for “recovery for mental distress suffered as the result of the
negligent destruction of property”).
144. Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
145. Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 813 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
146. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Due to
Treatment of Pets and Animals, 91 A.L.R.5TH 545 (2001).
147. See Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 194 (Tex. 2013) (quoting pet
welfare agencies’ concern that “‘pet litigation will become a cottage industry,’
exposing veterinarians, shelter and kennel workers, animal-rescue workers, even
dog sitters, to increased liability”); Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 799
(Wis. 2001) (“Were we to recognize a claim for damages for the negligent loss of a
dog, we can find little basis for rationally distinguishing other categories of animal
companion.”).
148. See Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 191 n.49 (providing a state survey of courts’
recognition of pet “loss of companionship” damages).
149. See, e.g., Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183
(Civ. Ct. 1979) (finding plaintiff is entitled to damages beyond the market value of
the dog because “a pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere
in between a person and a piece of personal property”); Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d
at 798 (“Labeling a dog ‘property’ fails to describe the value human beings place
upon the companionship that they enjoy with a dog. A companion dog is not a
fungible item, equivalent to other forms of property.”). Despite these cases’ strong
language, Hankin notes they have little precedential value. Hankin, supra note
129, at 343–47.
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private interest in the Mathews test is that it would require a judge
to insert his or her subjective viewpoint into the test. 150 However, as
Professor Pierce notes, judges often insert their subjective view
while balancing the private interests in the Mathews test by assessing
the relative value of such things as “welfare benefits, . . . a
government job, a person’s reputation, access to government
provided educational benefits, freedom from corporal punishment,
and hundreds of other objectively incomparable interests that
qualify as life, liberty, or property.” 151
Second, Pierce notes that a judge’s subjective view in balancing
the Mathews factors only creates “modest differences in the
required procedural safeguards,” which are flexible. 152 This is far
preferable, Pierce argues, to the right/privilege distinction where a
judge’s subjective view was sub rosa and was dispositive on whether a
hearing was granted or denied. 153 Furthermore, Pierce argues
“[o]bjective [judicial] valuation of protected interests is both
impossible and inappropriate”: “If the judiciary does not insert its
subjective values, some other government institution must.” 154
Outside tort law, measuring Brody’s value as Brody’s “actual
value” to Sawh, or as Sawh’s loss of companionship, is more
appropriate in light of the Mathews test, which balances subjective
interests rather than exact monetary values in determining
damages. 155 For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court
did not weigh the Goldbergs’ welfare benefits in monetary terms,
which would have been ascertainable. 156 Rather, the Court weighed
the Goldbergs’ interest in receiving public assistance in terms of
the “intrinsic value” to them as a family: a “means to obtain
essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.” 157

150. PIERCE ET AL ., supra note 24, § 6.3.4d, at 275.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 276.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (“[R]esolution of the issue
whether the . . . procedures . . . are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of
the governmental and private interests that are affected.”) (emphasis added);
cf. Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 192–93 (Tex. 2013) (making a distinction
between a dog’s “value” measured by the market, which the court held should be
used in tort damages cases, and the relational and emotional worth of a dog).
156. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1970).
157. Id. at 264.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

23

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 10

2013] UNREVIEWA BLE WARNING NOTICES AS PREDICATES

337

Finally, the Alaska Supreme Court, 158 the Washington State
Court of Appeals, 159 and a California appeals court, 160 have all
weighed the private interest of a pet owner in the Mathews test
beyond the pet’s fair market value.
c.

Departing from the “Fair Market” Valuation of Companion
Animals

The Sawh court cited century-old animal law precedent
holding that dogs, like domestic farm animals, should be measured
by their fair market value. 161 Measuring companion animals by their
fair market value, though, stems from a legal anachronism where
dogs traditionally had a “special status” under the law and were not
treated as full property. 162 Animals traditionally were separated into
two categories: unowned wild animals (feræ naturæ), which, “until
killed or subdued, there is no property,” 163 and domestic animals
(ferae domitæ), in which the right of property is “perfect and
complete.” 164 Because the crime of larceny was punishable by death
in some periods of English history, courts limited the scope of what
was considered property. 165 In limiting the scope of property before
the twentieth century, courts held that dogs were not domestic
animals, and thus were not property. 166
158. Haggblom v. City of Dillingham, 191 P.3d 991, 996 (Alaska 2008) (“While
pets are considered property under the law of Alaska, we agree with the parties
that the emotional bond people feel toward their pets elevates this interest above
most property.”) (footnote omitted).
159. Mansour v. King County, 128 P.3d 1241, 1246 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006)
(“[T]he bond between [the] pet and [the] owner often runs deep and . . . many
people consider pets part of the family.”); Rhoades v. City of Battle Ground,
63 P.3d 142, 150 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (finding an interest in a pet is greater than
mere economic interest because pets are not fungible).
160. Phillips v. San Luis Obispo Cnty. Dept. of Animal Regulation, 183 Cal.
App. 3d 372, 377 (1986) (“[I]t is equally true [that] there are no other domestic
animals to which the owner or his family can become more strongly attached, or
the loss of which will be more keenly felt.” (quoting Johnson v. McConnell,
22 P. 219, 200 (Cal. 1889))).
161. See Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 2012) (citing Harrow v. St. Paul
& Duluth R.R. Co., 43 Minn. 71, 72, 44 N.W. 881, 881 (1890); Smith v. St. Paul City
Ry. Co., 79 Minn. 254, 82 N.W. 577 (1900)).
162. FAVRE , supra note 54, at 36–38.
163. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (“It is
admitted that a fox is an animal feræ naturæ, and that property in such animals is
acquired by occupancy only.”).
164. See Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698, 701 (1897).
165. FAVRE , supra note 54, at 37.
166. Id.; see United States v. Gideon, 1 Minn. 292, 295 (1856) (finding the
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Beginning in the 1930s courts began to eliminate the special
status of dogs as “imperfect or qualified” property and put dogs in
the same category as domesticated farm animals, whose value was
measured by the market. 167 Companion animals, though, are unlike
domestic animals, such as horses, pigs, or cows, because they have
no ascertainable economic value measured by what their owner
could receive for them on the existing market. 168 While the fair
market value for farm animals, such as cattle, is a viable method of
valuation because a cattle rancher owns cattle for economic
reasons, pets are owned for their companionship, and therefore
their value is unconnected to any market force. 169 If Sawh’s interest
in Brody was economic, Sawh would have just replaced Brody with
another dog rather than spend tens of thousands of dollars on
appeals and Brody’s boarding costs at the pound. 170
The Sawh court, therefore, should have ignored this
antiquated precedent, which has no basis in today’s realities, of
valuing companion animals under their fair market value. This is
especially true in the Mathews balancing test, which weighs interests,
not mere economic value.
2. The Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation
Under the second Mathews factor, disallowing Sawh to be
heard on the potentially dangerous designation significantly
increased the risk of an erroneous deprivation of property because,
despite the court’s finding, the designation was used as a predicate
element of the dangerous designation, and ultimately led to the
City euthanizing Brody. First, the court erred in determining the
potentially dangerous designation was merely a warning notice, and
misconstrued the City Code as only requiring the existence and not
the correctness of the potentially dangerous designation. Second,
the court’s ruling that the dangerous designation only required the
killing of a dog is not an indictable offense because animals with no value, such as
dogs, are not in the meaning of “beasts” in the statute, which includes animals that
have an “intrinsic value,” such as horses, oxen and cows).
167. FAVRE , supra note 54, at 36–37.
168. Id. at 36.
169. See DeFabritiis, supra note 108, at 239–44 (noting that by the end of the
twentieth century the role of pets had evolved from service to pure
companionship). Many animal owners treat their pets as children—they purchase
pet holiday gifts, travel with their pets, schedule play dates with their dogs, and
provide their pets with health insurance and day-care. Id. at 241–42.
170. See Simons, supra note 66.
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existence of the potentially dangerous designation conflicts with
U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the court’s own precedent, and a
similar case from the Ohio Supreme Court. Third, the value of
giving additional process is high because the dispute of whether
Brody bit or playfully scratched the first person involves
“adjudicative” facts, which are best dealt with at a hearing where
the parties are present. Finally, because the City could determine
the validity of a potentially dangerous designation at the same
hearing on the dangerous dog designation, the court failed to
recognize that the financial and administrative burdens to the City
would be low.
a. “Potentially Dangerous”: A Simple Warning, Predicate
Offense, or Both?
One crucial issue in Sawh was whether the potentially
dangerous designation functioned as a warning notice or a
predicate offense under the plain language of the City Code. 171
The mere issuance of a warning from a city to put owners on notice
of their animal’s dangerous tendencies would not trigger the Due
Process Clause because no property interest has been restricted. 172
However, a predicate offense that provides a basis on which a city
later deems a dog “dangerous” may trigger the Due Process Clause
where the predicate is an element used to deprive property. 173
The City Code is subject to the same rules of statutory
construction as the Minnesota Statutes. 174 When interpreting a
statute, courts “first look to see whether the statute’s language, on
its face, is clear or ambiguous.” 175 “An unambiguous statute must be
construed according to its plain language.” 176 Only if the statute is
ambiguous will courts look outside the statutory text to ascertain
legislative intent. 177 In ascertaining legislative intent, courts
presume the legislature did “not intend a result that is absurd,
171. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627, 634–35 (Minn. 2012).
172. See id. at 632, 635.
173. See Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d 663, 668–69 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d,
823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012).
174. LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 101.02(1) (2013).
175. Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000);
see M INN. STAT. §§ 645.16–.17 (2012).
176. M INN. STAT. § 645.16; Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Minn. 2012)
(citing State v. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Minn. 2002).
177. M INN. STAT. § 645.16; Erdman v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 788 N.W.2d 50,
56 (Minn. 2010) (citing Wynkoop v. Carpenter, 574 N.W.2d 422, 425).
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impossible of execution, or unreasonable,” 178 or intend to violate
the Minnesota or United States Constitution. 179
Section 503.15(5) of the City Code provided that an animal
control officer shall have the authority to designate an animal as a
dangerous animal upon receiving evidence of the following:
(a)The animal has, when unprovoked, bitten, attacked or
threatened the safety of a person or domestic animal as
stated in division (3)(a) above; or
(b)The animal has been declared potentially dangerous and the
animal has then bitten, attached [sic] or threatened the
safety of a person or domestic animal as stated in division
(3)(a) above. 180
The court of appeals concluded that “the city deemed [Sawh’s] dog
‘dangerous’ because the dog had already been declared ‘potentially
dangerous’ and subsequently bit a person” under the meaning of
section 503.15(5)(b). 181 The Minnesota Supreme Court did not
disturb this conclusion. In construing section 503.15(5)(b) the
supreme court found:
To uphold the designation of an animal as “dangerous,”
the City must find only that an animal control officer has
previously declared an animal “potentially dangerous” and
provided written notice of that fact to the owner, not that
the “potentially dangerous” designation was correct. . . . In
other words, the purpose of the “potentially dangerous”
designation is simply to put owners on notice of their
animal’s dangerous tendencies. . . . Accordingly, because
the City Code requires only the existence of a “potentially
dangerous” designation to declare an animal “dangerous,”
the City was not required to provide Sawh with an
opportunity to challenge the correctness of that designation
at a later hearing. 182
The City Code is ambiguous because it is susceptible to more
than one reasonable interpretation. 183 On the one hand, the
178. M INN. STAT. § 645.17(1); Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d at 278 (“[C]ourts should
construe a statute to avoid absurd results and unjust consequences.”).
179. M INN. STAT. § 645.17(3).
180. LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(5) (2010) (emphasis
added), quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627, 636 (Minn. 2012).
181. Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d 663, 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 823 N.W.2d
627 (Minn. 2012).
182. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 634–35 (citations omitted).
183. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d at 278 (quoting Amaral v. St. Cloud Hosp.,
598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999)).
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Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the potentially dangerous
designation was more than a mere warning because the designation
could act as a predicate on which the City later could deem the dog
“dangerous” under section 503.15(3)(a). 184 This section defines a
“dangerous animal,” among other things, as an animal that has
(1) “been found to be potentially dangerous and . . . [(2)] aggressively
bites, attacks or endangers the safety of humans or domestic
animals.” 185 On the other hand, the supreme court’s interpretation
that the potentially dangerous designation acts only as a warning is
also reasonable because section 503.15(4), which defines when an
animal control officer may designate a dog as “potentially
dangerous,” provides that an officer shall cause the owner of the
potentially dangerous animal to be notified in writing. 186 The City
also could not place any restrictions on a dog designated as
“potentially dangerous.” 187
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s construction of the
ambiguous section of the Lino Lake’s City Code is erroneous
because its interpretation leads to absurd and unreasonable
results. 188 Under the court’s construction, for example, a city could
lawfully pass an ordinance providing that a driver will be given two
speeding “warning notices” where no fine or penalty is imposed
and on the third speeding incident the driver will suffer a
mandatory one-year license revocation. Allowing the underlying
facts behind the prior warnings to be unreviewable at a subsequent
hearing, as the supreme court did in Sawh, creates a substantial risk
of an erroneous property deprivation because an officer working
for the city may have made an innocent mistake, or may have been
acting arbitrarily. Under the supreme court’s ruling in Sawh,

184. Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d at 668.
185. LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(3)(a)(5) (emphasis
added), quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 636. Although the court of appeals cited
the definitional section of the ordinance, the section construed by the supreme
court was section 503.15(5)(b), which permits an animal control officer the
authority to designate a dog as “dangerous” based on two elements: (1) a dog is
found to be “potentially dangerous,” and (2) the same animal is involved in a
subsequent bite or attack. Id. § 503.15(5)(b), quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 635.
186. Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 635 (citing LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 503.15(4)).
187. Id. at 633.
188. See M INN. STAT. § 645.17(1) (2012) (providing that in interpreting
statutes courts should presume “the legislature does not intend a result that is
absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss1/10

28

Mishek: Constitutional Law: Procedural Due Process on Doggie Death Row: U

342

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1

though, the city would be free to issue arbitrary warnings because
the Due Process Clause was not triggered.
The above scenario is antithetical to the “fair play” essence of
the Due Process Clause, 189 which seeks to protect the individual
against arbitrary government action 190 and to provide procedural
safeguards to illuminate underlying facts to prevent erroneous
decisions from innocent error. 191
A better construction of the ordinance is one that recognizes
that the potentially dangerous designation in the City Code
functions both as a warning and as a predicate at various stages of
the procedures provided in the City Code regulating dogs.
The potentially dangerous designation originally functions as a
warning notice when first issued, thus not triggering a hearing.
This effectuates the original intent of dangerous dog laws in
preventing and not merely reacting to dangerous animals. 192 When
the potentially dangerous designation subsequently is an element
of the dangerous dog designation, then a better construction of the
ordinance is that the potentially dangerous designation acts as a
predicate offense. Given that the purpose of statutory construction
is to “[s]ave and not to destroy” a legislative act, 193 this
interpretation saves the ordinance from absurd, unreasonable, and
unconstitutional results. 194
b.

The Court’s Construction of the City Code Contradicts
Precedent on Due Process and Predicate Offenses

At oral arguments, Justice Stras of the Minnesota Supreme
Court asked the counsel for both the City and Sawh why the U.S.
Supreme Court case of Bell v. Burson 195 should not give Sawh a right
to a hearing on the potentially dangerous designation. 196 Justice
189. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
190. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (citing Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889)).
191. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963), quoted in Bd. of
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591–92 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
192. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text (discussing the probable
legislative intent of the dangerous dog laws).
193. E.g., Kaufman v. Swift Cnty., 225 Minn. 169, 173, 30 N.W.2d 34, 37
(1947).
194. See M INN. STAT. § 645.17(1) (2012).
195. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
196. Oral Argument at 29:30, 56:25, Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012)
(No. A10-2143), available at http://www.tpt.org/courts/MNJudicialBranchvideo
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Stras was not given a complete answer of why the facts of Sawh are
analogous to or distinguishable from Bell to demand a similar or
different result—at no fault of either counsel since the case was
never discussed in their briefs. To answer Justice Stras’s question,
Bell, along with other similar cases concerning due process and
predicate offenses, would guarantee Sawh a hearing on the
potentially dangerous designation at the subsequent dangerous
dog hearing.
In Bell, after an uninsured driver was involved in a car
accident, Georgia law required the driver to either post a bond or
security cash deposit of the amount of damages the injured party
claimed in a pending civil suit, or the Georgia Department of
Public Safety would revoke his license. 197 The driver requested an
administrative hearing where he asserted he was not liable for the
accident; however, the Georgia Department of Public Safety would
only review (1) if the driver was involved in the accident (i.e., the
mere existence of the accident), and (2) if the driver had posted
the cash bond (i.e., whether the driver failed to comply with the
subsequent condition resulting in the driver’s license revocation).198
The Court in Bell held that because the possibility of liability
acted as a predicate for the license revocation, when the driver did
not pay the cash bond, the driver had a right to be heard on
whether there was a reasonable possibility he was liable for the
amounts claimed. 199 The driver, therefore, had a right to judicial
review of the probable correctness of his liability—not merely the
existence of his possible liability.
Similarly, the Court in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez 200 found
that immigrant defendants had the due process right to challenge
the lawfulness and not the mere existence of their prior
deportations, which were used as an element of a felony offense of
illegally reentering the United States after deportation. 201 The
defendants argued the prior deportations were unlawful because
they were not informed of their right to counsel and therefore the
deportations could not be used as predicate offenses. 202 While the

_NEW.php?number=A102143.
197. Bell, 402 U.S. at 537.
198. Id. at 537–38.
199. Id. at 541–42.
200. 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
201. Id. at 837–40.
202. Id. at 831–32.
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Court found no congressional intent to sanction challenges of the
lawfulness of the deportation, 203 the Court also found that to
impose criminal sanctions predicated on any deportation,
regardless of how violative of the rights of an alien the hearing may
have been, does not comport with procedural due process. 204
The Court found:
Our cases establish that where a determination made in
an administrative proceeding is to play a critical role in
the subsequent imposition of a criminal sanction, there
must be some meaningful review of the administrative
proceeding. . . . This principle means at the very least . . .
an alternative means of obtaining judicial review must be
made available before the administrative order may be
used to establish conclusively an element of a criminal
offense. 205
In State v. Cowan, a county dog warden in Ohio declared
Cowan’s dog as “vicious” under a county ordinance, placing
restrictions on the dog. 206 Cowan later failed to abide by the vicious
dog restrictions and was charged with various misdemeanor
charges, where the vicious dog designation was used as a predicate
offense. 207 The Ohio Supreme Court held that using an
unreviewable vicious dog designation by an animal control officer
as an element of a crime violates procedural due process. 208 The
court found the law unconstitutional on its face because the vicious
dog designation restricted the defendant’s property without a right
to a hearing. 209 Finally, the court found the law unconstitutional as
applied because the vicious dog designation was used as an
unreviewable and conclusive element of the charged crime. 210
203. Id. at 833–37.
204. Id. at 837. Therefore, even if the Minnesota Supreme Court was correct
that the ordinance only required the existence of the potentially dangerous
designation, under Mendoza-Lopez, the court must determine whether declaring a
dog “dangerous” based on any potentially dangerous designation—no matter how
arbitrary or erroneous the original designation was—comports with the
constitutional requirement of due process. Id. at 837–38.
205. Id. at 837–38 (citations omitted).
206. 814 N.E.2d 846, 847 (Ohio 2004).
207. Id. at 848.
208. Id. at 850.
209. Id.
210. Id. Similar to how the Lino Lakes City Attorney and Chief of Police told
the City Council the potentially dangerous designation was conclusive, see Sawh I,
800 N.W.2d 663, 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), the Cowan court disapproved of the
state repeatedly telling the jury that the warden had determined that the dogs
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In State v. Wiltgen, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a
judicially unreviewed license revocation from a prior driving while
intoxicated (DWI) offense cannot be used as a predicate to
enhance a future DWI charge when the defendant has not waived
review of the license revocation. 211 Wiltgen was charged with a thirddegree DWI and her license was automatically revoked. 212 While
Wiltgen requested judicial review on her license revocation, she was
arrested for another DWI and was charged with an enhanced
second-degree DWI based on two aggravating factors, one of which
was the unreviewed license revocation. 213 Employing the Mathews
test, and relying on Mendoza-Lopez, the court held that Wiltgen’s
procedural due process rights were violated because her liberty
interest was high, and using the existence of a stayed license
revocation as a “conclusive element of a crime . . . greatly increases
the risk of an erroneous deprivation.” 214
The chart below provides a quick comparison of the four
previously mentioned cases to the facts in Sawh:

were “vicious” and it was not the jury’s job to decide whether it was fair for the dog
warden to make the determination. See Cowan, 814 N.E.2d at 850.
211. 737 N.W.2d 561, 569–70 (Minn. 2007). Under Minnesota DWI law when
an individual refuses a test to determine blood alcohol level, the individual can be
charged with a crime, such as a higher-level third-degree DWI offense, and the
individual’s license is automatically revoked. M INN. STAT. §§ 169A.20, subdiv. 2,
169A.26, subdiv. 1(b), 169A.52, subdiv. 1, 3 (2012). However, the individual may
request judicial review on the license revocation. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 2.
212. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d at 565.
213. Id.; see M INN. STAT. § 169A.25, subdiv. 1(a) (providing that a person who
is driving while impaired where two aggravating factors are present is guilty of DWI
in the second degree). An “aggravating factor” means a “qualified prior impaired
driving incident,” which includes “prior impaired driving-related losses of license.”
Id. § 169A.03, subdiv. 3.
214. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d at 569.
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or Offense
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Result or Adverse
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2nd Incident
or Offense

Issue Sought
to be
Barred at
2nd Hearing
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Potential
Result

Bell v.
Car
Burson 215 accident

None: Civil suit
to determine
liability pending

Failing to pay
cash bond

U.S. v.
Illegal
Mendoza- presence in
Lopez 216 the U.S.

Deportation
proceeding
resulting in
deportation

Illegal reentry Lawfulness of Felony
deportation conviction

State v.
217
Cowan

Failing to
Vicious dog
Correctness Multiple
confine the
designation
of vicious dog misdemeanor
without a hearing dog under the designation convictions
requirements

Dog attack

Third-degree
DWI charge
State v.
218 resulting in
Wiltgen
license
revocation
Sawh v.
City of
Lino
Lakes 219

Liability

None: License
Correctness
revocation stayed; September 13, of license
requested hearing 2005, DWI
revocation
pending

License
revocation

Seconddegree DWI
conviction

Correctness Dangerous
April 8, 2010, City designates
Brody as “poten- October 15,
of potentially
dog bite or
dog
tially dangerous” 2010, dog bite dangerous
scratch
designation
without a hearing
designation

At first glance, the supreme court’s decision in Sawh seems
distinguishable from the above cases because the first adverse
decision against Sawh, unlike the four other cases, could not alone
result in a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 220 However, this is
not important because the other courts were not examining
whether the parties deserved a hearing at the time of the first
adverse decision, but rather if the parties had a right to a hearing
about the correctness of the first adverse decision when it was later
used as an element or predicate of the second offense. 221
215. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
216. 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
217. 814 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2004).
218. 737 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. 2007).
219. 823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012).
220. See Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 633 (observing that the government is to
provide sufficient process “only when the government has the ability to deprive an
individual of a protected interest” (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)).
221. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 834 (“The issue before us is whether a federal
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The Cowan court found regardless of whether the defendant was
afforded a hearing on the vicious dog determination, the law was
unconstitutional as applied because the vicious dog element of the
crime was removed from the jury’s consideration (i.e., its existence
was conclusive). 222 The court said that due process guarantees a
person the right of “controverting, by proof, every material fact
which bears on the question of right in the matter involved. If any
question of fact or liability be conclusively presumed against him,
such is not due process of law.” 223
The five cases share two interrelated propositions. First, in
cases where an adverse decision or designation is used as a
predicate offense or element of a subsequent offense, the original
adverse decision or designation plays a crucial role in a statutory
scheme where its absence will release or reduce the individual of
criminal or civil consequences. 224 For example, in Cowan, without a
vicious dog designation, the misdemeanor charges are dismissed. 225
In Wiltgen, if a judge finds in favor of the defendant at the
revocation hearing, the prosecutor cannot use the revocation as a
predicate to enhance the DWI charge. 226
Second, because the existence of the prior offense or
designation is needed to support a second subsequent offense,
which can deprive someone of their liberty or property, a person
has a due process right to have a hearing on the correctness or
lawfulness of the prior adjudication or designation, before it is used
as a conclusive element. 227 To allow the unreviewed predicate
offense to be a conclusive element would risk an erroneous

court must always accept as conclusive the fact of the deportation order . . . .”);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971) (finding the original question of full
liability would be adjudicated in a civil case between the parties involved); Wiltgen,
737 N.W.2d at 566 (finding the issue in the case was whether using an unreviewed
license revocation as an aggravating factor in a subsequent DWI charge violated
due process); cf. Cowan, 814 N.E.2d at 850 (holding that the appellee had a right
to a hearing on the original vicious dog designation, but also that the vicious dog
designation cannot be used as a conclusive element of a subsequent criminal
offense).
222. Cowan, 814 N.E.2d at 850.
223. Id. (quoting Williams v. Dollison, 405 N.E.2d 714, 716 (Ohio 1980)).
224. See Bell, 402 U.S. at 541.
225. See Cowan, 814 N.E.2d at 847–48.
226. See Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d at 565 (explaining how a license revocation can
lead to a higher-level DWI charge).
227. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837–38 (1987);
Bell, 402 U.S. at 542; Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d at 570; Cowan, 814 N.E.2d at 850.
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deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 228 For example, the Court in
Bell found that a hearing should determine if there is a “reasonable
possibility of a judgment being rendered” against the petitioner so
the required cash bond, loss, or license would not be taken
erroneously because of an unfounded civil claim. 229
The Bell, Mendoza-Lopez, Cowan, and Wiltgen court decisions
create the rule that where an adverse decision or designation by the
government could potentially deprive an individual of life, liberty,
or property in the future based on the action or inaction of an
individual, and that original designation is used as a predicate or
element of a subsequent offense, then the defendant has a
procedural due process right to a fair hearing to review the
correctness of the original offense.
The facts and the scheme of the ordinance in Sawh are
sufficiently analogous to these cases to demand a similar result of
the right to a hearing of the potentially dangerous designation in
order to mitigate the risk of an erroneous deprivation of property.
The potentially dangerous designation is not merely a warning but
plays a crucial role in the scheme of the ordinance because it can
be used as one of two elements to declare a dog “dangerous.” 230
If the potentially dangerous designation is found to be issued in
error then the dangerous dog designation should fail. 231
In addition, allowing the potentially dangerous designation to
be used as a conclusive element in the dangerous dog designation
creates a substantial risk that Sawh’s property could erroneously be
restricted or deprived. 232 Even if Brody bit a person at the second
incident, without a review of why Brody was designated as
“potentially dangerous,” an animal control officer’s innocent
mistake or arbitrary, capricious, or irrational decision would
remain uncorrected.

228. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d at 569.
229. Bell, 402 U.S. at 540.
230. LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(3)(a), (5)(b) (2010)
(providing that an animal can be found “dangerous” if it 1) has been declared to
be “potentially dangerous” and 2) subsequently bit, attacked, or threatened the
safety of someone), quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627, 635–36 (Minn. 2012).
231. Lino Lakes will not have this problem anymore because it has
subsequently revised its City Code to no longer have a potentially dangerous
designation. See LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.01 (2013).
232. See Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d at 570 (“[T]he opportunity for erroneous
deprivation is more significant where judicial review has not been provided . . . .”).
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Probable Value of Additional Procedures

In determining the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
property, the Mathews test also asks courts to weigh the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. 233
Because this note disagrees with the Minnesota Supreme Court that
the City Code only requires the existence of the potentially
dangerous designation, additional procedures to determine the
correctness of the designation would have value, especially since
the designation can form one of the two elements to deprive or
restrict an individual of his or her property. 234
Additional procedures are not always valuable. Professor Davis
writes that the valuableness of the additional procedures and
safeguards is dependent on whether the facts of the case are
“adjudicative” or “legislative” in nature. 235 “Adjudicative facts usually
answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with
what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of
facts that go to a jury in a jury case.” 236 “Legislative facts do not
usually concern the immediate parties but are the general facts
which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and
discretion,” so additional trial-like procedures are not always
useful. 237
The question of whether Brody bit or scratched the first
individual and whether the animal control officer was correct in
designating Brody as “potentially dangerous” involve classic
adjudicative facts because the parties are “particularly well-situated
to assist the trier-of-facts in resolving the issue.” 238 Therefore, an
additional hearing would be valuable to prevent the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of property because the parties—the Sawhs,
the pedestrian, and the animal control officer—were all at the
incident and are well suited to help the trier of fact to determine
the correctness of the potentially dangerous designation.
233. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
234. See LINO LAKES, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(5)(b), quoted in
Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 635.
235. PIERCE ET AL ., supra note 24, § 6.3.4b, at 271.
236. Id. (citing 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.2 (4th ed. 2002)).
237. Id. For example, the question in Brown v. Board of Education of whether
separate educational facilities are inherently unequal concern legislative facts.
Id. at 272.
238. Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined there was a factual
dispute about whether Brody bit or scratched the first passerby. Sawh I,
800 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012).
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3. The Government Interest, Including Administrative Burdens
Under the third Mathews factor, courts consider the
government’s interest, which includes “the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” 239 The supreme court was correct to determine the
government has a compelling interest in ensuring the health and
safety of its citizens, and this includes the regulation of dangerous
dogs. 240 However, if Sawh was given a right to challenge only the
potentially dangerous designation when it was used as a predicate
for the dangerous designation, then the supreme court failed to
recognize that the administrative and financial burdens to the city
in providing a brief hearing would be minimal. 241 Many of the same
parties and witnesses to the incident leading to the potentially
dangerous designation, as well as the same city officials, would all
be present at the dangerous dog hearing. 242 Although the City
Council did not formally review the potentially dangerous
designation, the parties did present facts about the incident,
demonstrating that any additional time spent on considering the
potentially dangerous designation would not be burdensome. 243
Second, as the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted, many other
municipalities provide some sort of review after the city designates
a dog “potentially dangerous.” 244 A review of the twenty most
populous cities in Minnesota 245 reveals that of the eighteen cities
that adopted the Minnesota Legislature’s dangerous dog statute,
only four—Burnsville, 246 Eden Prairie, Minnetonka, and
239. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
240. See Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627, 635 (Minn. 2012).
241. See id.
242. See id. at 630–31 (discussing how the animal control officer, the Sawhs,
and the police chief were present at the dangerous dog hearing).
243. Id. at 631.
244. Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d 663, 670 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
245. Apple Valley, Blaine, Bloomington, Brooklyn Park, Burnsville, Coon
Rapids, Duluth, Eagan, Eden Prairie, Edina, Lakeville, Maple Grove, Minneapolis,
Minnetonka, Plymouth, Rochester, St. Cloud, St. Louis Park, St. Paul, and
Woodbury as of the 2010 Census and 2012 population estimates. Annual
Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2012, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (May 2013), http://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2012/SUB
-EST2012-3.html (follow “Minnesota” hyperlink; then follow “Modify Table”
hyperlink under “Actions”; then follow sort descending hyperlinks under “Census”
or “2012”).
246. BURNSVILLE , M INN., CITY CODE § 6-2-17 (2013). Burnsville’s ordinance is
facially unconstitutional because it provides numerous restrictions on dogs
designated “potentially dangerous” but provides the owners no right to review. Id.
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Rochester 247—do not provide a right to appeal a potentially
dangerous designation. 248
Other ordinances demonstrate the host of ways Minnesota
cities handle the administrative and financial costs of providing a
right to a hearing on a potentially dangerous designation. For
example, to appeal a potentially dangerous designation in the City
of St. Paul, an animal owner must initially post a $50 fee to cover
administrative costs of scheduling a hearing, and if the dog owner
loses the appeal, the owner will be responsible for the actual
expenses of the hearing, up to $1000. 249 The City of Minneapolis
requires the animal owner to pay $250 prior to receiving a hearing,
but imposes no fee if the designation is upheld. 250 Cities also reduce
costs by holding hearings in front of hearing officers, or by
accepting into evidence reports by animal control officers without
requiring them to testify. 251
The City of Lino Lakes argued to the Minnesota Supreme
Court that even though other cities provide hearings on a
potentially dangerous designation, Lino Lakes should not be
forced to incur additional fiscal and administrative burdens in
providing additional process when, unlike these other cities, Lino
Lakes did not place restrictions on potentially dangerous animals.252
However, the City assumed that any ruling adverse to its position
would require it to grant a hearing after the potentially dangerous
designation. This is not the case, though, because a hearing on the
247. Eden Prairie, Minnetonka, and Rochester adopted M INN. STAT.
§§ 347.50–347.56 (2012), which only provide a right to a hearing for a dog
declared “dangerous.” EDEN PRAIRIE , M INN., CITY CODE § 9.07 subdiv. 20 (2013);
M INNETONKA, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 925.105(2)(b) (2013); ROCHESTER,
M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 106A.18 subdiv. 2 (2013).
248. The following fourteen city ordinances provide a right to appeal a
potentially dangerous designation: APPLE VALLEY, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES
§ 91.20(C)(1) (2013); BLOOMINGTON, M INN., CITY CODE § 12.105(c) (2013);
BROOKLYN PARK, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 92.25(B) (2013); COON RAPIDS,
M INN., CITY CODE § 6-122(2) (2011); DULUTH, M INN., LEGISLATIVE CODE § 6-98
(2013); EAGAN, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10.11, subdiv. 7(C) (2012); EDINA,
M INN., CITY CODE § 300.17, subdiv. 6(D) (2011); LAKEVILLE , M INN., CITY CODE
§ 5-1-9(B)(1)(c) (2013); M APLE GROVE , M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6-13(j)
(2013); M INNEAPOLIS, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 64-110(f) (2013); PLYMOUTH,
M INN., CITY CODE § 915.25, subdiv. 6 (2013); ST. CLOUD, M INN., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 1040:80, subdiv. 2(a) (2009); ST. LOUIS PARK, M INN., CITY CODE
§ 4-89(d) (2013); ST. PAUL , M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 200.11(b) (2013).
249. ST. PAUL , M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 200.12(b)(1) (2013).
250. M INNEAPOLIS, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 64.110(f) (2013).
251. See, e.g., PLYMOUTH, M INN., CITY CODE § 915.25, subdiv. 6 (2013).
252. City’s Supreme Court Brief, supra note 68, at *3.
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potentially dangerous designation would only be required once the
designation was used as a predicate to deprive an owner of the
property if his animal was declared “dangerous.” The various city
ordinances providing a hearing on a potentially dangerous
designation demonstrate that providing such hearings is common
and not unduly burdensome. Cities would stop placing restrictions
on potentially dangerous animals if the hearings were too
burdensome.
B.

Alternatives to the Court’s Ruling: A Proposed Holding

A better alternative to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling
in Sawh can be summed up in the following holding: an individual
has a due process right to a post hoc hearing to review the
correctness of a government-issued warning notice, but only when
the warning is later used by the government as a predicate to
deprive an individual of property.
This alternative holding better aligns with U.S. and Minnesota
Supreme Court precedent in Bell, Mendoza-Lopez, and Wiltgen, along
with the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Cowan, which all stand
for the principle that where a government’s adverse decision is
subsequently used against an individual as a predicate offense to
deprive him or her of life, liberty, or property, then that individual
has a due process right to review the correctness of the predicate
offense. 253
The Minnesota Supreme Court should have also held that the
post hoc review on a predicate offense must, at the earliest, be
conducted at the hearing requested by the individual on the
subsequent offense that can deprive the individual of their
property. Due process requires that an individual be heard at a
“meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 254 The meaningful
time to be heard is when a warning, originally used by the
government to give notice, is transformed into a predicate to an
offense that can deprive the person of his or her liberty or
property. 255
253. See supra Part IV.A.2.b.
254. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
255. The court in Cowan held that the defendant had a due process right to
be heard immediately on the predicate vicious dog determination. State v. Cowan,
814 N.E.2d 846, 850 (Ohio 2004). However, unlike the potentially dangerous dog
designation in Sawh, the vicious dog designation restricted Cowan of her property
at its issuance. Id.
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Whether a hearing allows an individual to be heard in a
“meaningful manner” is context driven, because due process is
flexible and “is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances.” 256 Because Sawh’s
case involves classic adjudicative facts, a post hoc hearing to review
the potentially dangerous designation should afford Sawh the right
to present evidence in the form of testimony and exhibits. In
accordance with multiple municipal ordinances, and Minnesota’s
dangerous dog law, the trier of fact should be a hearing officer or
an administrative judge who is neutral and impartial. 257 Live
testimony and a chance for cross-examination of city officials is
preferable. Considering the financial burdens on cities, however,
and the fact that a potentially dangerous designation could be
challenged years later when it is used as a predicate offense, cities
should be allowed to present evidence—such as police reports or
animal control records—without further foundation.” 258 However,
cities should be required, as was the practice in Lino Lakes, to
adequately document the reasons for the original adverse
designation in case such designation is later used as a predicate for
a subsequent offense. 259
This alternative holding satisfies the Mathews test. Allowing a
post hoc hearing on the potentially dangerous designation only
when the designation is used as a predicate at a subsequent hearing
256. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961); see also Brooks v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 584 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998).
257. See M INN. STAT. § 347.541, subdiv. 4 (2012) (requiring an impartial
hearing officer); BLOOMINGTON, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 12.105(c),
12.106(f)(1) (2013) (providing for an administrative law judge to oversee a
hearing); DULUTH, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6-98(c) (2013) (providing for an
impartial hearing officer retained by the city to conduct the hearing);
M INNEAPOLIS, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 64.110(f)(1) (2013) (requiring a
hearing officer); ST. PAUL , M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 200.11(b)(1) (2013)
(same).
258. See EAGAN, M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10.11 subdiv. 7(C) (“[The]
Rules of Evidence shall not be strictly applied.”); ST. PAUL , M INN., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 200.11(b)(1) (requiring no foundation for city reports).
259. But cf. Peter N. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of
Roth and Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146, 157 (1983) (arguing that a requirement for
a statement of reasons for any adverse issued decision against a person
undermines administrative discretion and the freedom to rely on intuition and
impressions to pursue institutional goals). Professor Simon’s critique of “reason
requirements” can be distinguished because “intuition and impressions” are not
useful for an animal control officer in determining whether a dog bit or attacked a
person.
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corresponds to Sawh’s weightier property interest in Brody as a
companion animal. 260 Such a hearing is valuable because it cures
the substantial risk of an erroneous deprivation of property based
on either an innocent mistake or an arbitrary decision by a city
official in declaring Brody “potentially dangerous.” Finally, this type
of hearing also recognizes cities’ interest in saving administrative
resources and costs because most of the parties, witnesses, and city
officials will already be present at the dangerous dog hearing.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court was correct to find the Due
Process Clause was not triggered at the time the potentially
dangerous designation was issued. However, the court erred in
determining that, once Sawh’s property could be restricted and
deprived, Sawh had no due process right to be heard about the
correctness of the potentially dangerous designation.
Under the Mathews due process test, the court undervalued
Sawh’s private interest in the life of his dog by relying on centuryold animal law precedent, which holds that the value of a dog, like
other domesticated farm animals, is its fair market value. The court
also erred in its construction of the City Code because its
interpretation led to unreasonable results that are contrary to the
purpose of the Due Process Clause: the protection of the individual
against arbitrary state action. 261 The court’s determination that the
City Code only required the existence and not the correctness of
the designation ran contrary to its own precedent in Wiltgen, U.S.
Supreme Court precedent in Bell and Mendoza-Lopez, and the Cowan
case from the Ohio Supreme Court. Sawh is sufficiently analogous
to these cases, which stand for the proposition that to allow an
unreviewed offense or adverse designation to be used as a
conclusive predicate on a subsequent offense creates a substantial
risk of an erroneous property deprivation, and violates the
requirements of procedural due process.
Because due process is flexible, the court should have
determined under the Mathews test that Sawh had a due process
right to a post hoc hearing on the potentially dangerous
260. See supra Part IV.A.1.
261. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 584 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551,
559 (1956)); supra Part II.
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designation at the subsequent dangerous dog or destruction order
hearings.
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